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INTRODUCTION 
The government of Sudan has 
consistently accepted refugees on a 
humanitarian basis since the mid 1960s. 
The refugees in the country are in: (i) 
reception centres; (ii) organized wage- 
earning and semi-urban settlements; and 
(iii) urban and rural areas where refugees 
have self-settled among the local 
population. The main concern here is the 
self-settled urban refugees, with more 
emphasis on those in the capital, 
Khartoum. 
In the beginning of 1989 there were 
a total of 770,000 refugees throughout 
the country. Among them, 60,000 were 
from Uganda and 5,000 from Zaire 
residing in Southern Sudan. Another 
75,000 Chadianrefugees were in Western 
Sudan. The majority, about 630,000, 
were in the Eastern and Central regions, 
and were all from Eritrea and Ethiopia; 
there is no breakdown of the proportion, 
but themajorityare Eritreans. Of 770,000 
refugees, only 38% were assisted by the 
UNHCR as of 31 July 1988. The others 
managed their own affairs by sharing 
whatever services were available to 
Sudanese nationals. Among the 630,000 
Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the 
Eastern and Central regions of the 
country, about 25% are in organized 
wage-earning and semi-urban 
settlements. Another 17% are in transit 
centres living on international aid and 
about 60% are spontaneously settled. 
These data are, however, indicative 
rather than conclusive. 
Self-settled or spontaneously 
settled refugees are not provided with 
any kind of assistance. They are 
scattered both in the rural and urban 
areas. According to government sources, 
there are about 210,000 refugees in urban 
centres (Khartoum: 45,000; Gedaref: 
35,000; Kassala: 50,000; Port Sudan: 
50,000 and another 30,000 in the small 
towns of Es Showak, Wad Madeni and 
Damazin with about 10,000 in each). A 
recent census of the refugee population 
in Khartoum, however, found that the 
total number of refugees in the capital 
was about 35,000 instead of 45,000. Even 
though the census was based on a total 
enumeration, it is reasonable to expect 
some refugees may have evaded the 
census. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON URBAN 
REFUGEES 
Generally the Sudanese 
Government has one of the most 
generous refugee policies in the world. 
Despite economic difficulties caused by 
a range of factors such as civil war in the 
South, drought, unfavourable terms of 
trade, declining productivity in all 
It is not clear how the 
government intended to 
distinguish war victims 
from drought victims. In 
the refugees1 countries of 
migin, war and 
environmental degradation 
are interwoven. 
sectors of the economy, debt burden etc., 
its doors still remain open. Until 1988 
even environmental refugees (those 
whose flight was prompted by severe 
environmental degradation) were 
provided with succour. After 1988, 
however, there has been an intention, at 
least at a policy level, to refuse entry to 
those who flee their countries of origin 
due to environmental degradation 
which poses a threat to their lives. For 
instance, the Minister of Refugees, 
during his visit to the Eastern region, 
instructed the authorities in the area and 
in the Central region not to admit 
additional refugees. He stated that 
"refugee status is to be granted only to 
war victims." 
It is not clear how the government 
intended to distinguish war victims from 
drought victims. In the refugees' coun- 
tries of origin, war and environmental 
degradation are interwoven. Similarly 
unclear is how the government's new 
policy has affected the inflow of new 
asylum seekers. According to the Gen- 
eral Project Manager, Syd H. M. Osman, 
the new restrictive policy had resulted in 
a considerable decrease in the number of 
new arrivals. 
Some evidence suggests that the 
government was determined to 
implement its restrictive refugee policy. 
For example, on January 15, 1988 the 
newspaper, Ayam, reported that 
"concerned authorities in the Eastern 
region have refused to grant asylum to 30 
Ethiopians". According to COR 
authorities, the decision was based on 
the country's new policy towards 
refugees (Ayam, Issue6230, Jan. 15,1988). 
However, there is no concrete evidence 
showing that the country's refugee 
policy has become more restrictive than 
it was in the past. 
Even though it has accepted 
refugees from neighbouring countries in 
the past three decades, Sudan has always 
attempted to place all refugees in 
organized camps and settlements. One 
concern has been national security. The 
most important reason seems to be the 
minimization of the strain such a large 
influx of refugees may cause on the 
country's economy, social services and 
common property resources such as 
water, grazing and woodlands. By 
placing refugees in spatially segregated 
sites, the government wants to achieve 
two things. First, it wants to discourage 
the refugees from competing with 
nationals for scarce natural resources, 
employment opportunities, consumer 
goods and physical and social services. 
Second, it wants the international donor 
community to meet their needs until they 
voluntarily return to their countries of 
origin. 
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The Asylum Act of 1974, which 
regulates refugee status in the country 
embodies the basic principles of the 1951 
United Nations and the 1969 OAU 
Conventions. Not only is it seen as 
generous, but it is also viewed asa model 
legislation for emulation by other Third 
World countries. However, there are 
certain serious restrictions which, on the 
one hand, influence the future 
anticipation of refugees, and, on the 
other, constrain the ability of refugees to 
engage in meaningful economic 
activities commensurate with their skills 
and previous work experiences. 
Section 10(2) of the Asylum Act 
forbids a refugee to leave a place of 
residence specified for him/her by the 
authorities concerned. This constitutes a 
serious deprivation of freedom of 
movement. Formally, the government 
can legally restrict the freedom of 
movement of refugees within its 
territories by making reference to Art. 26 
of the 1951 Convention as stipulated in 
Art. 42 of the same Convention. The 
deprivation of the right of freedom of 
movement imposed by section 10(2) of 
the Asylum Act is, however, inconsistent 
with the recommendations of the 1979 
Arusha Conference and with the spirit of 
the OAU Charter of Human and People's 
Rights (see Recommendation 5 of the 
Arusha Conf. and Art.12.1 of the 
Charter). 
As indicated, most refugees in 
Eastern and Central Sudan are self- 
settled. Formally, residence outside 
organized centres is illegal and refugees 
who reside outside the camps or 
settlements without authorization are 
subject to harassment, detention, fine 
and deportation to remote rural areas. 
According to the Regulation of the 
Asylum Act, refugeesmust register upon 
entry, but the overwhelming majority do 
not, mainly for fear of being sent to the 
reception centres in the unfamiliar rural 
areas or because the authorities do not 
insist on registration. Refugees with 
urban backgrounds see no future in the 
rural camps or settlements. They try to 
avoid relocation by not reporting to the 
authorities upon arrival. The majority 
are self-settled without proper 
documents. Legally, they are not 
refugees because their status is not 
determined by the authorities 
concerned. 
Sudan's settlement policy appears 
extremely unrealistic because it does not 
take into account the huge amount of 
capital and natural resources required to 
implement such a policy. It seems that 
the government is aware of its inability to 
implement its own policy. The 
awareness of this may have led to its 
tolerance of spontaneous settlement by 
the refugees in the urban areas without 
formally sanctioning it. However, as 
long as Sudandoesnot officially sanction 
spontaneous settlement of refugees in 
the urban centres, such tolerance only 
Whenever aggrieved, they 
cannot seek redress from 
formal government 
structures because they are 
not legally entitled to reside 
in the urban centres. 
paves the road to abuse by municipal 
and police authorities. 
Technically, unregistered refugees 
haveno legal rights. They arenot entitled 
to protection or work. They are not 
allowed to engage in income-generating 
activities, nor do they have access to 
public amenities. Yet, not only is thereno 
single case of refoulement, but a 
considerable proportion do engage in 
income-generating activities (wage- 
labour, trade, etc.), send their children to 
school, enjoy access to the available 
health services, etc. without being 
formally entitled to such rights. 
However, since such entitlements 
cannot be claimed by the refugee 
communities by right, access can be 
denied arbitrarily by municipal 
authorities. Refugees pay bribes to 
secure residence and work permits or to 
escape harassment for illegal residence 
in the urban areas. By adopting a policy 
which it cannot implement, the 
government has unintentionally 
rendered the refugee communities 
vulnerable to the whims of corrupt 
bureaucrats, police officers and 
municipal authorities. Despite its 
determination, the government has not 
been able to phase out spontaneous 
settlement. 
The effects of this unrealistic policy 
have been detrimental to both the 
country and the refugees. If refugees 
were allowed to participate freely in the 
economic life, they would have 
contributed to Sudan's social progress 
and economic growth. One constraint 
faced by the industrial sector is high tum- 
over of Sudanese skilled labour to the 
Gulf States (Bank of Sudan: 1980;1987). 
The uninhibited participation of 
refugees in the labour market may 
partially overcome the skilled 
manpower bottleneck in Sudan. Sudan 
has not invested in education or training 
of refugee labour. Refugees would have 
represented an asset if the government 
had a policy that favoured tapping such 
a resource. 
Many refugees have never lived in 
rural areas, but government policy does 
not take this into account. All refugees, 
regardless of their social or professional 
backgrounds, are expected to stay in 
camps or settlements in rural areas. As 
long as the government does not address 
the question of urban settlement, its 
policy will not only remain ineffective, 
but it will exacerbate the plight of the 
self-settled refugees. 
The government says it does not 
want refugees in urban centres, but it has 
no place for them elsewhere. It is not 
willing to provide assistance to refugees 
and it also does not allow aid agencies to 
fulfil this function for fear of attracting 
more influx from the rural areas. 
Refugees can only survive by engaging 
in income-generating activities to which 
they are not formally entitled. 
Their weak legal status has, 
therefore, made their position extremely 
vulnerable. They are often harassed by 
corrupt police and security officers who 
threaten them with deportation to the 
rural areas. To escape this, refugees are 
often forced to pay bribes in cash or 
services. Greedy employers take 
advantage of their undocumented 
position and landlords also charge them 
exorbitant rents. Whenever aggrieved, 
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they cannot seek redress from formal 
government structures because they are 
not legally entitled to reside in the urban 
centres. Fear of deportation to rural areas 
is universal, and problems are often 
solved through an informal network of 
inter-personal relations which are often 
biased in favour of those who have better 
contacts and resources. 
Fearing deportation to rural areas 
and not seeing any future for themselves 
or their children in Sudan, most refugees 
are too insecure to make investments in 
the cities. Aid agencies have also been 
reluctant to alleviate their plight because 
they are discouraged by the government. 
The majority of the agencies are also 
reluctant to provide assistance to 
refugees in urban areas because they do 
not consider their situation as stable. 
Consequently, most refugees in 
Khartoum dream of returning home or 
emigrating to the Gulf states or to the 
West. Among 500 refugee household 
heads I interviewed in Khartoum, less 
than 20% of the Eritrean refugees were 
planning to stay in the Sudan until the 
circumstances in connection with which 
they fled their country were eliminated. 
Among Ethiopian refugees, none 
thought of either returning home or 
staying in Sudan, but did dream of 
migrating to OECD countries. 
Other researchers have also found 
the same results. H. Schonmeier, for 
example, states: 
Almost all the refugees in Khartoum 
would like to leave their present 
location. The majority of them would 
like to leave the Sudan either in the 
direction of the Gulf States or of the 
northern industrial states (1988). 
A. Pezaro also states that all her 
inte~iewees, except two, wanted to be 
resettled in the Western industrialized 
countries. Not only that, but most of her 
women inte~iewees preferred not to 
give birth in the Sudan. She further 
states: 
Some of them even excluded marriage 
from their future plans as long as they 
cannot either go back to Eritrea or 
leave for resettlement. This was 
partially ascribed to the economic 
problems they faced, but a more 
important factor seems to be the 
feeling that there is no future for the 
children if they are born in a situation 
of being somewhere "in-between" or 
not really at home (1987). 
Other studies confirm the refugees 
in urban areas perceive no viable points 
of reference to plan for a new life in the 
Sudan. 
Some reports claim a discernible 
difference between attitudes of Moslem 
and Christian refugees regarding 
willingness to put roots in Sudan. A 1984 
report by the US Embassy in Khartoum, 
for example, states that the Moslem 
refugees in Port Sudan have successfully 
acculturated and have ceased to be 
refugees except in a technical sense. 
What the report overlooks is that 
the factor which has facilitated adapta- 
tion of the refugees is not religion as 
Theoretically, a community 
that sees no future in a certain 
environment would be 
expected to be resigned and 
lethargic, but available 
evidence shows that the 
majority of refugees are hard- 
working, resilient and 
creative. 
such, but common ethnicity between the 
host society and the refugee community. 
Religion was not decisive. Moslem 
refugees from the Eastern low lands and 
the Eritrean highlands are as alienated as 
their Christian brethren in all the urban 
centres of Sudan. Among the refugees in 
Kassala, T. Kuhlman found ethnicity as 
one of the factors that facilitate refugee 
integration. In areas where there is no 
common ethnicity between the host and 
the refugee population, as in Khartoum, 
there is no discernible difference of atti- 
tude between Moslem and Christian 
refugees regarding future anticipation. 
This is noted in all the available studies. 
In Pezaro's study, the refugee 
women, who were unwilling to give 
birth and who excluded marriage from 
their future plans as long as they 
remained in Sudan, were Moslems. 
Respondents in my study comprised 
Moslems and Christians and there was 
no discernible difference regarding 
determination to leave the Sudan. All 
were equally determined to leaveSudan, 
given the chance. 
Yet despite the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of the refugees 
saw no viable future in Sudan, they kept 
on applying for extremely limited 
resettlement opportunities without 
being discouraged by rejections; the 
majority leave no stone unturned to earn 
an income both for survival and saving 
to facilitate departure from Sudan. Most 
activities they engaged in were far below 
their qualifications and skills. 
Theoretically, a community that 
sees no future in a certain environment 
would be expected to be resigned and 
lethargic, but available evidence shows 
that the majority of refugees are hard- 
working, resilient and creative. What 
underlies the unwillingness to stay in 
Sudan? In addition to the unfavourable 
government policy towards refugees, 
already discussed, additional likely 
factors spring to mind: (1) Lack of 
international assistance; (2) Cultural 
incompatibilities; (3) lack of economic 
opportunities; (4) exaggerated 
expectations of opportunities in the 
industrialized countries. These are in 
turn discussed in the following. 
1. LACK OF ASSISTANCE 
When a refugee leaves his/her 
country of origin, there is always an 
expectation of a better future not only in 
termsof physical safety and security, but 
also in terms of material assistance at 
least at the initial stage. There is an 
expectation of an organized reception. 
On arrival, the refugee concerned finds 
out that s/he has to rely on her/his own 
ingenuity both for survival and for 
acquiring the necessary documents to be 
able to proceed to the border towns. 
For many, the movement does not 
end at the border towns, but a 
considerable number aim for the capital 
city -Khartoum-and from there to the 
Gulf States or Western Europe, Canada, 
USA and Australia. For themajority, this 
represents an uphill task which may 
never materialize. Whether one 
succeeds with such tasks is determined 
by the amount of money, personal 
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contacts with Sudanese authorities, 
influential refugees, relativesand friends 
both within and outside the Sudan. 
Those refugees who lack the necessary 
financial resources and/or  social 
networks often fall easy prey to 
corruption and abuse. The majority of 
the refugees belong to this category. 
Those who take advantage of such 
For example, a woman whom 
they see greeting a man in 
the street, or a woman who 
does not wear a tobe (veil) is 
likely to be mistaken as 
a prostitute. 
vulnerable groups are not only 
Sudanese, but also refugees who work 
independently or with Sudanese. As 
will be revealed in the following 
discussion, the situation is more 
burdensome to women. 
The absence of organized reception 
is exacerbated, as we saw earlier, by a 
government policy which forbids 
refugees from residing in the urban 
centres. For the majority, residence in 
the urban areas is crucial, not only 
because the urban environment is 
familiar, but it is only if they live in the 
urban centres, mainly Khartoum, that 
their dream of emigration to the Gulf 
States or to the OECD countries may 
materialize. 
All the embassies are situated in 
Khartoum. For the majority, residence in 
the capital is only possible either by 
obtaining documents through non- 
formal channels (through payment of 
bribes) or by evading controls. The 
groups that victimize them are aware of 
their vulnerability and use different 
means to force them into social networks 
of dependence. Emigration, especially 
to the OECD countries, is, therefore, 
perceived by the majority as a form of 
liberation from being socially degraded 
and economically exploited. 
2. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
Civil society is more secularized in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea than in the Sudan. 
In Sudan social norms, values and 
gender relationships are defined by 
Sharia. The dominant culture is Islamic 
and rigidly paternalistic. Roles are 
defined with a very low degree of 
tolerance for non-conformity, especially 
when the non-conformist is a woman. 
Refugees come from patriarchally and 
paternalistically determined social 
organizations, but these are not on the 
same level as in Sudan. Compared to 
Sudan, cultural pluralism, at least in 
urban centres, is relatively more 
tolerated in the refugees' countries of 
origin. All schools are open for both men 
and women from early childhood. 
Women socialize relatively freely with 
men, not only in private, but also in 
public spheres. Sudanese society, at least 
the Islamic north, is rigidly divided along 
gender lines and there are rules which 
govern interaction between the sexes. 
Non-conformity to these tacit and 
explicit rules, especially by women, often 
leads to ostracization and humiliation. 
Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, 
regardless of their religious affiliations, 
do not fit easily into this cultural pattern. 
The reason for this does not only derive 
from original cultural dissimilarities 
between the two societies, but also from 
the drastic changes refugees undergo in 
lifestyle as a result of flight. When young 
refugees flee their country, they not only 
escape persecution, but also 
authoritative parental controls. Young 
refugees, who were socialized to 
conform to norms and to accept the 
values and standard behaviour of their 
society, find themselves suddenly freed 
from such authoritarian socialization 
mechanisms. 
In the new environment, they try to 
enter into inter-personal relationships 
which would have not been allowed 
even in their countries of origin. For the 
host society the cultural contrasts, 
namely the behaviour patterns, the 
norms, thought and belief habits of the 
refugees, become too radical to the extent 
of being considered as a threat to cultural 
hegemony. To many conservative 
Sudanese, the behaviour of refugee 
women is considered to be unacceptable 
and dangerous. They fear that emulation 
of such behavioural patterns by 
Sudanese youth, especially by young 
women, may "contaminate the cultural 
purity" of Sudan. 
For example, a woman whom they 
see greeting a man in the street, or a 
woman who does not wear a tobe (veil) is 
likely to be mistaken as a prostitute. 
Pezaro, in her study of the situation of 
Eritrean refugee women in Khartoum, 
found that the way Eritrean women 
handled the rules that govern gave rise to 
conflicts in daily life in which: 
refugee women have to be afraid of 
their reputation, if they - as they are 
used to in Eritrea -talk or interact in 
an "easy" way with Eritrean as well as 
with Sudanese men. They [the refugee 
women] complain about being 
considered either as potential 
marriage candidates by certain 
Sudanese boys or as prostitutes. They 
feel, therefore, restricted in their 
leisure-time activities or generally in 
their freedom of movement (1987,15). 
The response of refugees is varied 
and the factors influencing the nature of 
their responses are quite complex. In the 
short-run, however, many refugees tend 
to make some modifications in their 
behaviour, especially in those aspects 
"detestable" to the dominant culture. 
Generally, however, they tend to cling to 
their former way of life, especially when 
no serious costs are to be incurred or 
serious consequences to be suffered as a 
result. On the whole, the refugee 
communities constitute distinct and 
separate communities in the different 
residential areas of Khartoum. 
The intolerance of the dominant 
culture to non-conformism is considered 
by many refugees as constituting a fetter 
to social progress for which, in their 
view, no solution exists, other than 
emigration either back to their countries 
of origin or to the OECD countries. 
In my study, among the refugees in 
Khartoum, I found discernible 
differences in terms of perceived 
solutions entertained by Ethiopian and 
Eritrean refugees. For the Ethiopian 
refugees, the only solution they 
perceived was emigration to the OECD 
countries, while for the majority of the 
Eritreans, repatriation following the 
elimination of the circumstances in 
connection with which they fled their 
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country was the most acceptable 
solution. Emigration to the OECD or the 
Gulf countries was preferred only if the 
circumstances in their countries 
remained unchanged. Another 
difference which emerged from the 
results of the study was that while none 
of the Ethiopians wanted to stay in 
Khartoum, some Eritreans said they 
would be willing to stay if the 
government changed its restrictive 
policy towards urban refugees. 
The Sudanese seem to consider their 
culture superior to those of the refugee 
communities. As a result, they lookupon 
the behavioural patterns of the refugees 
with contempt. Karadawi states: 
The Sudanese core-culture despises 
what is considered as the moral laxity 
of therefugees. Theincomplete family 
life, unrestricted movement in town 
and the liberated socialization by 
females are both alien and detestable 
to the reserved, maledominated and 
chauvinistic Khartoum society (1978, 
19)). 
It is noteworthy to point out that 
many of the refugees looked down upon 
the Sudanese way of living. A 
considerable number of the refugees I 
interviewed had an oversimplified view 
of the Sudanese lifestyle. For example, 
the seclusion of women from public life 
and the extreme male domination that 
characterizes Sudanese culture was seen 
asbeing oppressive and backward. For a 
large proportion of the refugees, 
language also represents a serious 
barrier, because a large majority, 
especially among the Ethiopians, do not 
speak Arabic. 
The consequence was that, for the 
majority of refugees, an alternative long 
term solution outside such a society was 
seen as being more preferable, rather 
than radically modifying their culture to 
fit with the styles of living of their host 
society. Sudan is viewed by the majority 
as a stepping stone for further 
emigration. In fact, even though the 
argument may sound counterfactual, one 
may safely assume that no matter how 
favourable the cultural environment in 
Sudan may have been, there would still 
be some who would wish to emigrate to 
the OECD countries, given the chance. It 
can be said that this category came to the 
Sudan due  to sheer geographical 
proximity and not to seek durable 
asylum. 
3. LACK OF ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Agriculture is the backbone of the 
national economy of the Sudan, which 
contributesabout 35% to GAP. Over 90% 
of the countqs total export earnings 
derive from it. About 80% of the 
population is dependent for its 
livelihood on the sector (The Six Year 
Plan of Economic &Social Development: 
1977; Kibreab: 1987). 
The manufacturing sector presents 
a small fraction of the national economy 
not only in terms of contribution to GAP, 
but also in terms of the amount of labour 
employed. Between 1982/83 and 1986/ 
87, the contribution of manufacturing 
and mining to GAP was only 7% (Bank of 
Sudan: 1987). The industrial sector has 
been suffering from serious problem of 
under-utilization of capacity throughout 
the 1980s due to obsolete and inefficient 
machinery, failure in electric power, 
shortages of supply of raw materials and 
spare parts, high skilled labour turn over 
to the oil-rich Gulf States, inefficient 
The material standard of 
living in the OECD countries 
compared to that in the Sudan 
is also higher, and relatives 
abroad genuinely believe that 
the living conditions of their 
relatives would considerably 
improve if they joined them. 
management, and transportation 
bottlenecks (Bank of Sudan: 1980; 1986; 
1987; The Six Year Plan of Economic and 
Social Development: 1977). The level of 
capacity under-utilization in the 
industrial sector, in the 1 9 8 0 ~ ~  has been 
estimated at 20-40% (Bank of Sudan: 
1985). 
The fact that the modern 
manufacturing sector constitutes a small 
fraction of the national economy and 
suffers from reduced production 
capacity suggests that employment 
opportunity in the urban sector is either 
little or non-exis tent. The consequence 
of this for the refugees' possibility to be 
absorbed in the modern industrial sector 
is extremely limited. The lack of 
employment opportunity in the urban 
sector is also, as indicated earlier, 
exacerbated by language difficulties. 
Since one of the constraints on industrial 
production is emigration of skilled 
labour to the oil-rich Gulf States, the 
presence of skilled individuals among 
the refugee population would have, 
under favourable government policy, 
filled the vacuum created by the 
departure of the Sudanese skilled labour 
force. This is, however, blocked partly 
by structural problems, such as lack of 
knowledge of Arabic, but above all by 
the stubborn resistance of the labour 
unions to open up membership to the 
refugees. The exclusion of union 
membership has in effect meant denial of 
entry into the industrial labour market 
(see Document of the Office of Refugee 
Affairs, US Emb.: 1983; 1984). The 
majority of the refugees in Khartoum are 
mainly employed in the service sector 
often in activities which do not correlate 
to their skills and past work experiences. 
Most of the refugee women are, for 
example, engaged in domestic labour 
regardless of their education or 
professional background. 
Even though there are some self- 
employed refugees in the informal 
sector, there are a whole range of 
structural problems which constrain 
effective refugee participation (Kibreab: 
forthcoming). These limited 
employment and other economic 
opportunities create, on the part of the 
refugees, a sense of pessimism. As a 
result, many see no future either for 
themselves or their children in the 
Sudan. Consequently, they become 
obsessed either with dreams of 
repatriation to their home country or 
resettlement in one of the OECD 
countries. 
4. EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS 
A considerable proportion of the 
refugees in Khartoum have relatives in 
the OECD countries. One would, 
therefore, expect them to have some 
information about the kind of life 
awaiting them in the countries of 
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resettlement. Judging from the data 
elicited among the refugees in Khartoum, 
I was struck by their level of ignorance in 
this regard. The majority had an 
oversimplified picture of life in the OECD 
countries. They perceived life in the 
countries' of resettlement as being free of 
problems. This is attributable to many 
factors. Most of the refugeesin the capital 
have had, since their childhoodla lifestyle 
which is uncritically Westem-oriented. 
This orientation is further reinforced by 
their to the core culture in Sudan, which 
is increasingly influenced by Islamic 
fundamentalism. Their relatives do not 
give them a true picture of the living 
conditions in the OECD countries. 
Several factors account for this. It is 
unusual among such communities to tell 
bad news to relatives in distant places for 
fear of creating worry and anxiety. The 
general tendency is rather to tell one's 
relatives that everything is fine even 
when this is not true. The material 
standard of living in the OECD countries 
compared to that in the Sudan is also 
higher and relatives abroad genuinely 
believe that the living conditions of their 
relatives would considerably improve if 
they joined them. 
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